How it happened: six links, one signer that never said no
The mechanism, the five EIP-7702 delegations checked on chain, and what the chain can and cannot prove.
Basis of every line: onchain read from Ethereum by UnyKorn with the raw file named · reported by firms, issuers, the exchange or press · preliminary the exchange's unconfirmed finding · article the 29 Oct fund-flow article · explorer a public label list read in a browser.
How it happened
Six links, one signer that never said no
The 50-authorization clue, checked on chain. Transaction 0xad99…298b (block 26,300,753, 20:20:59) was sent by the operator wallet 0x7C86…5CA0. It carries 50 authorizations for Binance 14 with nonces 18,914,775 to 18,914,824, all for chain id 1, all pointing at 0x63e8…6fAe. Only nonce 18,914,809 was valid; the other 49 failed with invalid nonce. An authorization takes effect only if its nonce matches the wallet's current nonce, and a busy hot wallet's nonce moves constantly, so the attacker had the signer produce a spread of 50 to be sure one would hit. Every one of those 50 carries a valid Binance 14 signature.
Our read: why this was not a protocol bug. EIP-7702 ran code chosen by whoever held signing authority, which is what it is for. On the other nine chains and on Binance 16 the same access produced ordinary signed transfers with no delegation at all. The common factor across all ten chains is the signing pipeline. EIP-7702 only made the Ethereum side faster and longer-lasting, because a single signature became a standing permission.
EIP-7702 delegations
Every delegation the operator sent was EIP-7702
| Time (UTC) | Wallet | Delegated to | Authorizations | Now | Transaction |
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