BLOCKCHAIN FRAUDBinance incident tracker · a UnyKorn LLC service
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Incident file · 29 Oct 2026 · compiled 1 Nov 2026Reading the latest snapshot

USD 6.3B left in one evening. The money is still on the map.

Basis of every line: onchain read from Ethereum by UnyKorn with the raw file named · reported by firms, issuers, the exchange or press · preliminary the exchange's unconfirmed finding · article the 29 Oct fund-flow article · explorer a public label list read in a browser, full addresses not yet imported.

Where is the money now?

Of the USD 6.3B taken, how much is frozen, how much is parked, how much is unknown

How the big wallets are being used

Left to right: where it came from, the wallet that received it, how it was turned into ETH, where the ETH is parked, and how money leaves. Tap a card for what it means. Statuses on watched wallets are computed from the latest reading; the rest say which source they come from.

Watch

Wallets we watch

Every address, read again every fifteen minutes

Balance, nonce and code for each watched address. A nonce that rises means the wallet sent something. A code starting with 0xef0100 means an EIP-7702 delegation is live. Pools with a nonce of zero have never sent a transaction. Small-wallet and feeder counts in the tape are read from the snapshot; the explorer figures appear with their own basis in the pools table.

WalletAddressETHChangeNonceDelegation

Alerts

Flagged at once, confirmed at finality

    Latest alerts

    Time (UTC)WalletWhat happenedBlockStatusTransaction

    What took place, in order

    From the first mixer deposit to the exits

    All times UTC. The strip shows 29 October from the rehearsals to the revocation: grey ticks are rehearsals, the orange tick is the delegation, the shaded window is the 3h 49m Binance 14 ran the attacker's code, dark ticks are the calls inside it, green is the revocation.

      How it happened

      Six links, one signer that never said no

      The 50-authorization clue, checked on chain. Transaction 0xad99…298b (block 26,300,753, 20:20:59) was sent by the operator wallet 0x7C86…5CA0. It carries 50 authorizations for Binance 14 with nonces 18,914,775 to 18,914,824, all for chain id 1, all pointing at 0x63e8…6fAe. Only nonce 18,914,809 was valid; the other 49 failed with invalid nonce. An authorization takes effect only if its nonce matches the wallet's current nonce, and a busy hot wallet's nonce moves constantly, so the attacker had the signer produce a spread of 50 to be sure one would hit. Every one of those 50 carries a valid Binance 14 signature.

      Our read: why this was not a protocol bug. EIP-7702 ran code chosen by whoever held signing authority, which is what it is for. On the other nine chains and on Binance 16 the same access produced ordinary signed transfers with no delegation at all. The common factor across all ten chains is the signing pipeline. EIP-7702 only made the Ethereum side faster and longer-lasting, because a single signature became a standing permission.

      EIP-7702 delegations

      Every delegation the operator sent was EIP-7702

      Time (UTC)WalletDelegated toAuthorizationsNowTransaction

      Where the money went

      One hub, nine pools (seven watched here), hundreds of staging wallets

      Click a node. Animated edges are paths the money has already taken. The pattern: anything an issuer can freeze was converted to ETH as fast as liquidity allowed, and the ETH was parked.

      The nine pools

      #AddressETHFunded byWatched

      Ethereum routes at the article's 23:24 snapshot

      RouteAsset inPathState

      The loan: how 60M USDT became 19,762 ETH without a sale

      Time (UTC)StepAmountTransaction

      What can be frozen, what cannot, what still stops it

      Where it is going now

      The exits, as of 1 November

      How to fix it

      Each link in the chain, and the control that breaks it

      The signing-policy, execution and persistence rows alone would have contained most of the Ethereum loss.

      Could it have been prevented?

      The response so far

      How we track it

      Workers read, agents record, the ledger witnesses

      Every component carries its honest state. Done means running and verified against the served response; a script that has never run is not done.

      The next layer

      GET /v1/health service, last snapshot time and block GET /v1/snapshot latest reading of every watched address, with its SHA-256 GET /v1/alerts moved, drained, topped_up, delegated, revoked GET /v1/watchlist the addresses being read

      Where it stands, 1 November

      ItemStatusBasis

      Sources

        License. The tracker's data, snapshots and API responses are published under CC BY 4.0: reuse them with attribution to Blockchain Fraud (UnyKorn LLC) and a link to blockchainfraud.org/incidents/binance-2026.

        Some outlets give slightly different times for the same event. On-chain timestamps are used where they exist. Exchange figures are company-reported. Raw chain reads: tracker/evidence/2026-11-01/ in the tracker repository.